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NOTES AND COMMENTS
CIVIL PRACTICE ACT CASES
APPEAL AND ERRoR-DEcISIONs REVIEWABLE-WHETHER ORDER QUASHInG
SERVICE OF SUMMONS ON GROUND THAT THE SAME WAS NOT PROPERLY SERVED
IS A FinAL ORDER UPON WHICH AN APPEAL MAY BE BASED--Before the Illinois
Supreme Court could reach the prime problem involved in Brauer Machine
& Supply Company v. Parkhill Truck Company' it found it necessary to
dispose of the preliminary question as to whether a final appealable order
existed therein. A motion had been made in the trial court, in that case,
to quash the service of process on the ground that defendant was a non-
resident corporation not doing business in Illinois. Service of process
on the Secretary of State as its purported agent, consonant with the
pertinent statute,2 was claimed to be invalid hence insufficient to confer
jurisdiction. The trial court granted the defendant's motion but entered
no other order so that the case remained nominally pending on the docket.
The circumstances were such that, unless the defendant voluntarily
appeared, the cause could not proceed and, if review of such order was
not permitted, a stalemate would ensue. It was held that, for all prac-
tical purposes, the order granting the motion to quash the service was a
final order capable of supporting appellate review.
Jurisdiction to review the decisions of the nisi prius courts is con-
ferred, in most cases, by statutory provision which limits the same to
final or so-called "appealable" orders3 except in a few enumerated in-
stances where limited review of interlocutory orders is sanctioned. 4 The
essence of finality typically involves a determination of the material
issues between the parties of such nature that the same might be said
to be settled thereby.5 Tested in such light, the order in the instant case
was far from being a final one for it in no way purported to deal with
the merits of the case. Squarely in point with the instant decision, how-
1 383 Ill. 569, 50 N.E. (2d) 836 (1943), affirming 318 Ill. App. 56, 47 N.E. (2d)
521 (1943). The principal question concerned the right to serve process on the
Secretary of State as agent for a non-resident motorist whose truck had travelled
over the highways of this state in order to reach its point of destination but which
truck had come to rest upon private property at the time when the injury oc-
curred in the unloading thereof. On that issue, the court held that the operation
of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 95 , § 23, had to be confined to suits brought for injury
produced during the actual use of the highway by the vehicle of the non-resident.
It indicated that the statute would be unconstitutional if expanded to meet the
situation presented by the instant case. For a related problem, see Jones v.
Pebler, 371 Ill. 309, 20 N.E. (2d) 592, 125 A.L.R. 451 (1939), and note thereon in
17 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REviEw 69.
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 95 , § 23.
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, § 201.
4 Ibid., § 202, sanctions appeal from interlocutory orders granting injunction,
overruling motions to dissolve the same, enlarging the scope of an injunction,
appointing a receiver or enlarging his powers. See also note on LeMenager v.
Northwestern Barb Wire Co., 296 Ill. App. 568, 16 N.E. (2d) 824 (1938), in 17
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvrEw 74.
5 City of Park Ridge v. Murphy, 258 Ill. 365, 101 N.E. 524 (1913); Thompson v.
Industrial Commission, 377 Ill. 587, 37 N.E. (2d) 350 (1941).
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ever, is the holding of the United States Supreme Court in the case of
Rosenberg Brothers & Company v. Curtis Brown CompanyO where the
trial court had entered a similar order upon an identical motion to quash
service. Such decision was construed to be a final judgment supporting
appeal as it amounted to a conclusive determination on a collateral point
which effectively terminated the pending litigation although not settling
the real controversy. While it is true that upon the decision of such
motion the court could not properly enter judgment dismissing the suit
unless requested, the plaintiff's forgetfulness to so move should be deemed
overcome by his action in seeking review. 7
It should be remembered, though, that an adverse decision upon such
motion, that is one upholding the service of process, is clearly not an
appealable order.8 The fact that the defendant is thereby forced to
litigate the merits of the case or suffer default does not prevent him from
assigning error on such ruling for the right so to do is expressly preserved
by rule of court 9 and has been recognized by judicial decision.1 0
VENUE-NATURE OR SUBJECT OF AcTION-WHETHFa OR NoT TERM "TRANS-
ACTION," AS USED IN STATUTE FIXING VENUE IN CiviL ACTIONS, REQURES THAT
THE SAME BE LIimTD TO DEALINGS WHICH ARE ADvERSARY OR WILL INCLUDE
TRANSACTIONS wITH THIRD PERSONS OUT OF WHICH NO CAUSE OF ACTION HAS
ARIsEN-Section 7 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act purports to fix venue
in civil actions generally as the county where one or more of the defend-
ants reside or "in which the transaction or some part thereof occurred
out of which the cause of action arose." 1 In LaHam v. Sterling Canning
Company,2 the court was called upon to interpret the "transaction" por-
tion of this statute as applied to a rather complicated situation. The
facts therein disclosed that the plaintiff was a resident of Wisconsin, as
were also the principal defendants. The latter had learned that a canning
factory at Sterling, Whiteside County, Illinois, could be purchased at a
price which would yield a substantial profit but they lacked sufficient
capital or credit to make the purchase. They offered the plaintiff a one-
third interest if he would help finance the deal. He accepted, and a pre-
liminary agreement was made between them in Wisconsin. Subsequently,
the two defendants, acting for themselves and for the plaintiff, contracted
6 260 U. S. 516, 43 S. Ct. 170, 67 L. Ed. 372 (1923).
7 See, for example, Luner v. Gelles, 314 Ill. App. 659, 42 N.E. (2d) 313 (1942),
noted in 21 CHICAGO-KENT LAw REvIEw 97, where appeal from an order denying a
motion for new trial was treated as an appeal from the final judgment subsequently
rendered.
8 Thomas v. Ritholz, 310 Ill. App. 166, 33 N.E. (2d) 932 (1941). But see Snyder v.
Whitney, 310 Ill. App. 297, 34 N.E. (2d) 95 (1941).
9 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, § 259.21.
10 In re Rackliffe's Estate, 366 Il. 22, 7 N.E. (2d) 754 (1937); Albers v. Brain-
berg, 308 Ill. App. 463, 32 N.E. (2d) 362 (1941).
1 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, § 131. Section 132 also uses the quoted language
when fixing venue in suits against corporations. As the same considerations are
involved in both sections, no attempt has been made to discriminate between them.
2 321 II. App. 32, 52 N.E. (2d) 467 (1943).
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with the owner for the purchase of the plant. A down payment was made,
all negotiations were carried on and the contract was completely executed
in Chicago, where the final payment and delivery of the deed occurred.
In the meantime, an Illinois corporation was formed by the parties to
take title to and to operate the plant. Plaintiff claimed that it was agreed
that he was to have a one-third interest in the corporation instead of in
the partnership originally planned. Such modification of the original plan
occurred in Wisconsin. The plaintiff contended that the capital structure
of the corporation was different from that planned and was one which,
in fact, deprived him of his one-third interest by permitting friends and
relatives of the principal defendants to share in the enterprise. By sub-
sequent wrongful acts, plaintiff claimed, the profits had been siphoned
off to the benefit of the defendants leading eventually to the practical
ouster of plaintiff from his position as shareholder. On these facts, a
suit in chancery was instituted in the Circuit Court of Cook County, which
suit was met with a challenge to the jurisdiction of the court. Plaintiff
invoked the statute above referred to, relying on that part of the whole
transaction which took place in Chicago as the basis for jurisdiction, and
the trial court agreed with him. On appeal from an interlocutory injunc-
tion granted following such decision, the Appellate Court for the First
District concluded that jurisdiction was lacking since nothing that had
occurred in Cook County afforded plaintiff any basis for complaint and
the events there were but incidental to the making of the original agree-
ment in Wisconsin or its breach by defendants by conduct occurring in
Whiteside County.
The "transaction" portion of the pertinent statute is unique with
Illinois, having been first enacted in 1933, 3 though somewhat similar
language appears in the Civil Practice Act sections dealing with joinder, 4
and also in the Evidence Act.5 Apart from such light as may be thrown
by decisions on questions of joinder or of evidence, then, the proper appli-
cation of the venue provision must be determined by the Illinois courts
without the benefit of judicial thought on the question in other jurisdic-
tions. Prior to the instant case, little content has been provided by
judicial interpretation in this state since only six cases have reached
the appellate stage and but two of them have had the benefit of consid-
eration by the Illinois Supreme Court. 6 The statute has, however, been
3 See Illinois Civil Practice Act Aimotated (Foundation Press, Chicago, 1933),
p. 21. Prior thereto, venue was limited to the county in which one or more of
the defendants resided, except that under the Chancery Act it might be fixed
where a defendant might be found: Cahill's Ill. Rev. Stat. 1931, Ch. 22, § 3.
4 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, §§ 147-8.
5 Ibid., Ch. 51, § 2.
6 Mapes v. Hulcher, 363 II. 227, 2 N.E. (2d) 63 (1936), noted in 14 CHICAGO-
KENT REVIEW 384; Furst v. Brady, 375 Ill. 425, 31 N.E. (2d) 606, 133 A.L.R.
558 (1940), noted in 19 CHIcAGo-KENT LAW REVIEW 293 and 20 CHIcAGO-
KENT LAW REVIEW 26; Whalen v. Twin City Barge & Gravel Co., 280 IMl. App.
596 (1935); Rembke v. Bieser, 289 Ill. App. 136, 6 N.E. (2d) 900 (1937); Reiter v.
Illinois Nat. Casualty Co., 291 Ill. App. 30, 9 N.E. (2d) 358 (1937); Consolidated
Gasoline Co. v: Lexow, 316 Ill. App. 257, 44 N.E. (2d) 927 (1942), noted in 22
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held constitutional in Mapes v. Hulcher7 as not violating due process and
serving merely to codify the legislative power to determine venue in
transitory actions.
The fundamental purpose of the legislature in permitting suits else-
where than in the county of defendant's residence was indicated, in the
Mapes case, to be one by which administrative convenience might be
served for the court recognized that local geographical and physical sur-
roundings might be more conveniently proved in one county than in
another. Certainly, witnesses to the occurrence would be more readily
available at the scene than at a distance. The plaintiff's choice of forum
has, therefore, been approved in personal injury cases brought where
the accident occurred,8 and the fact that service of process was had in
such county on a defendant personally present there, rather than in the
county of his residence, has been held immaterial.9 Such purpose would
also seem to be served by the decision in Reiter v. Illinois National
Casualty Company' where the complaint charged a conspiracy to con-
vert plaintiff's shares in a casualty company. Venue in Cook County
was upheld because some of the acts forming part of the alleged con-
spiracy occurred in that county.
Less apparent was the holding in Furst v. Bradyl" where the primary
question was whether the protection afforded by a policy of liability insur-
ance, the policy itself not being physically present in the state, could
serve to support the appointment of an administrator for a non-resident
decedent. Appointment had been attempted where the fatal automobile
accident had occurred on the ground that the policy protection consti-
tuted an asset of the estate. The Supreme Court held that it was a suffi-
cient basis for administration and that the "transaction" portion of the
statute applied. Such result was achieved because the court concluded
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvxEw 19. In People ex rel. Dahlin v. Lepman, 282
Ill. App. 305 (1935), the "transaction" question was raised but venue was upheld
on the basis of the residence of two of the defendants in the county in which
the suit was commenced. In Wilson v. Griffith, 288 Ill. App. 32, 5 N.E. (2d) 591
(1936), a suit on a contract was held to have been improperly dismissed on
motion after default judgment where the venue issue was not raised by the
motion, so that the plaintiff had no opportunity to join issue on the "transaction"
question. In Canright v. General Finance Corp., 33 F. Supp. 241 (1940), it was
said that the designation of an agent for service of process by a non-resident
corporation was a consent that the corporation might be sued in any court, state
or federal, having jurisdiction and that the place where certain avoidable
preferences were alleged to have occurred would be a proper place for suit.
7 363 Ill. 227, 2 N.E. (2d) 63 (1936), noted in 14 CHICAGO-KENT REvIEw 384.
8 In Whalen v. Twin City Barge & Gravel Co., 280 Ill. App. 596 (1935), plaintiff's
injuries were sustained in Scott County while working on a dredge anchored in
the Illinois River. Suit in such county was approved.
9 Rembke v. Bieser, 289 Ill. App. 136, 6 N.E. (2d) 900 (1937).
10 291 Ill. App. 30, 9 N.E. (2d) 358 (1937). McSurely, J., concurred in an order
striking plaintiff's brief, but dissented from the conclusion that venue lay in
Cook County.
11 375 Ill. 425, 31 N.E. (2d) 606, 133 A.L.R. 558 (1940), reversing In re Brady's
Estate, 303 Ill. App. 139, 24 N.E. (2d) 748 (1940), noted in 19 CHIcAGo-KENT
LAw REVisw 293 and 20 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REv 'W 26.
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that had the deceased lived he might have sued on the policy in the same
county in which the accident had happened and that right passed, at that
place, to his administrator.
The case closest to the instant one, however, is Consolidated Gasoline
Company v. Lexow. 12 There the plaintiff filed suit in St. Clair County for
an accounting and for reformation of an oil and gas lease with "other
relief of a transitory or personal character." All defendants resided in
Madison County, but jurisdiction in the St. Clair court was based solely
on allegations that the lease in question "was made and executed partly
in the County of St. Clair and partly in the County of Madison." Motion
by defendants to dismiss for lack of venue was held to have been improp-
erly granted, particularly since that motion was signed by the attorneys
for the defendants rather than by the parties personally.13 It was argued
that it was physically impossible for a lease to have been executed partly
within and partly without the county of suit, but the court said: "If one
party to the lease signed in Madison county and another party thereto
signed in St. Clair county, certainly the transaction would occur partly
in one and partly in the other. Contrary to the contention of the appellees,
it would not depend upon who signed last, nor where the instrument was
delivered."' 14 That case tended to give liberality to the interpretation
of the statute in question, since until both parties had executed the docu-
ment no lease in fact existed, but steps leading to that end were, appar-
ently, regarded as sufficiently a part of the "transaction" to sustain venue.
Any seeming conflict between that case and the instant one can be re-
solved by noting that the action there was based on the lease itself, while
in the instant case the suit was not brought on the contract of sale made
in Cook County but rather on the oral agreement formulated in Wiscon-
sin, or the subsequent wrongs in Whiteside County.
The present case, then, goes beyond these earlier cases for it was
argued that the term "transaction" embraced the entire series of agree-
ments, dealings and acts of the parties from the time the preliminary
contract was made; that without the acquisition of the plant the oral
agreement could not have been consummated; and that, if any step
occurred in Cook County, the courts thereof had jurisdiction. For answer
thereto, the court said: "If that were true a party could fix venue at any
place where an incident preliminary to the acts or omissions upon which
a cause of action is based, might have occurred, and if a series of events
or so-called transactions in one county had been most amicable but had
in later years given rise to a cause of action through acts committed
in another county, plaintiff could nevertheless fix the venue in the former
12 316 IMl. App. 257, 44 N.E. (2d) 927 (1942), noted in 22 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
RVEw 19.
13 Being in the nature of a plea to the jurisdiction, the same should be per-
sonally pleaded or it will be treated as a submission to jurisdiction: Pratt v.
Harris, 295 Ill. 504, 129 N.E. 277 (1920); Thomas v. Ritholz, 310 Ill. App. 166,
33 N.E. (2d) 932 (1941); McGuire v. Outdoor Life Pub. Co., 311 Ill. App. 267, 35
N.E. (2d) 817 (1941).
14 316 IM. App. 257 at 260, 44 N.E. (2d) 927 at 928.
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county by contending that the relationship through the years constituted
one transaction. We do not think it was the intention of the legislature
to fix venue at places where preliminary or incidental events occurred
or where acts of inducement, as distinguished from the component facts
of a cause of action, may have taken place."' 15 By its decision, then, the
court imposes the requirement that the transaction concerned be one out
of which the cause of action arises. It definitely becomes the sine qua non
to venue. Such "transaction" must also necessarily refer to some course
of dealing between the parties themselves and should not depend upon
dealings with third persons from which no dispute could arise.
The joinder section of the Civil Practice Act provides that, subject
to rules, all persons may join in one action, as plaintiffs, in whom any
right to relief in respect of or "arising out of the same transaction or
series of transactions" is alleged to exist. 16 Though the phraseology is
different, it might be reasonable to suppose that the term "transaction,"
particularly when used in the same statute, should possess the same
sense. But the factual situations involving joinder of parties will seldom
be analogous to those dealing with venue. There may be cases in which
it will be sought to join a defendant for purpose of placing venue in the
county of his residence, but generally this will not be so. In the usual
case the several defendants will be joined so that the plaintiff may obtain
relief against all of them, or the plaintiffs will be joined so that the entire
liability of the defendant may be determined at once. On the other hand,
in cases in which resort to the venue section is necessary, the parties
plaintiff and defendant will be clearly known and the locale of the suit
alone will be in question. Seldom, then, will the two questions coincide.
As a result, the instant case may have little value as precedent in other
than venue matters, but on that score it is a case of importance.
Fundamentally, the idea of venue concerns itself with the element
of trial convenience and it was, no doubt, that fact which prompted the
legislature to enact the "transaction" provision.17 Trial convenience,
however, does not mean convenience to the attorneys, but rather some
convenience to the parties themselves or to the court, as by way of
accessibility of evidence or witnesses. For that reason, the choice of
venue should be limited to those counties directly connected with the
particular cause of action.
R. C. BARTLETT
15 321 Ill. App. 32 at 43, 52 N.E. (2d) 467 at 472.
16 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, § 147, concerns joinder of plaintiffs, and § 148
deals with joinder of defendants.
17 In a note to Section 7 of the Civil Practice Act, found in Illinois Civil Prac-
tice Act Annotated (Foundation Press, Chicago, 1936 Supplement), p. 21, appears
the statement: "Though transactions and parts of them out of which causes of
action arise may have various meanings, the one here intended is one based on
trial convenience, balancing all factors involved." See also Sunderland, "The
Provisions Relating to Trial Practice in the New Illinois Civil Practice Act," 1 U.
of Chi. L. Rev. 188 at 191 (1933).
